A Losing Putin Is Still a Dangerous Putin

Revisiting "What Time Is It?" as Russia threatens Europe and America makes its promises conditional

Last October, I asked what time it was. I wrote about the fragility of authoritarian power: Putin’s rigidity, Trump’s need to humiliate the people around him, and the difficulty these men had trusting one another. My argument was that their dysfunction created opportunities for democratic resistance. I still believe that. This morning, with smoke rising over Moscow, I am thinking about how much destruction a failing authoritarian project might produce before anyone gets to call its failure a victory.

According to Reuters‘ reporting on the September 20 attack, Ukrainian drones struck the Moscow oil refinery, and two people died in the surrounding region. Moscow’s mayor claimed that 450 drones headed toward the capital had been intercepted. That count comes from Russian authorities; reporters independently witnessed explosions and smoke from the refinery.

I believe we are entering an exceptionally dangerous phase of this war. This morning’s attack does not establish that Putin will widen it. But it brings me back to a question the earlier essay left insufficiently developed: what happens when the weaknesses that obstruct an authoritarian ruler’s ambitions also obstruct his ability to accept an outcome short of them?

In “What Time Is It?”, I described Putin as having “lost the capacity for risk.” That was too broad. I was describing his inability to take a diplomatic opportunity, to accept the uncertainty involved in a settlement and some measure of reintegration. My concern now is that he may be willing to take military risks precisely because he cannot accept that political uncertainty.

A compromise would require him to tolerate an outcome he could not completely control. Escalation might feel like a way to recover control. That is a hypothesis about his judgment, not knowledge of his private thoughts. It is also why the word “risk” needs more care than I gave it. A ruler can recoil from a concession and embrace a gamble that is far more dangerous to everyone else.

I increasingly see Putin’s war as a struggle for the survival of his regime. I cannot establish that a particular defeat would cost him his freedom or his life. The danger I am describing does not require that outcome to be certain. It requires him to believe that accepting defeat threatens his position more than continuing the war does. Under that assumption, the interests of the ruler and the interests of the country become very different things.

The earlier essay’s account of authoritarian weakness gives us no permission to relax. If the weakness includes an inability to recognize an acceptable stopping point, it can become a reason to expect further destruction.

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American intelligence officials have already considered a possible expansion beyond Ukraine. In August, CNN reported US assessments that Putin could attempt a limited attack on an allied country to test NATO’s resolve. The scenarios included a small-scale incursion, and sources identified the Baltics or Poland as possible targets. The timing remained open. This warning predates the smoke over Moscow.

A limited incursion could have an objective much smaller than occupying a country and much larger than the territory seized. Putin could try to create a situation in which NATO members disagree about what happened, whether it qualifies as an armed attack, and what they are prepared to risk in response. An operation that failed to defeat the alliance militarily could still expose a failure of political will.

The Institute for the Study of War has described this possibility: a small land incursion or a strike against a Baltic state could seek to undermine Article 5 without requiring the large, visible buildup associated with a full-scale invasion. Its assessment also acknowledged that whether Putin had directed or approved such an operation was unclear.

There are reasons to doubt that he would attempt it. A September 17 analysis published by the Atlantic Council argues that Russia’s commitments in Ukraine constrain even a limited incursion and emphasizes that Baltic forces would fight immediately, rather than wait for a collective decision. Those countries have agency. Their soldiers are not scenery in an argument about the American president.

I hope that assessment is right. I also think the relevant danger includes Putin making a catastrophic mistake about what resistance he would encounter. His calculation would not have to be sound to get people killed. Recognizing the limits of Russian military capacity is essential; assuming Putin will recognize those limits in the same way would be a separate judgment.

If he believes Washington will hesitate, then American hesitation has already entered the calculation before anyone crosses a border. If he believes European governments will spend the first hours arguing about American intentions, he may see an opportunity in the argument itself. The uncertainty becomes something he can attempt to exploit.

Last year’s essay emphasized democracy’s capacity to coordinate despite its disagreements. The danger here is that Putin could try to turn those disagreements into a reason the alliance fails to act. Democratic resilience has to include the ability to make and carry out a decision when an adversary is counting on delay.

This is why I find the discussion of American troop reductions so appalling. The question cannot be confined to how many personnel Europe ought eventually to provide for its own defense. It has to include what the transition tells a hostile government about the risks of attacking during it.

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The proposed withdrawal of 25,000 American troops has not happened. It has not been finally approved. Reuters reported on September 17 that Pete Hegseth wanted to announce a cut of roughly that size in June, encountered resistance, and instead initiated a six-month review. The same reduction remains a possible outcome.

According to the same investigation, Hegseth singled out countries that say “no, or maybe, or wait and see” when Washington wants support. “This will be a real review,” he said. “Some countries will fail.” A Pentagon questionnaire obtained by the reporters asked whether allies had been “publicly supportive of U.S. foreign policy priorities.”

An ally can have reasons to disagree with an American president. Its exposure to Russian aggression should not become a means of disciplining it for that disagreement. Yet the administration’s own language makes political compliance part of the assessment of America’s military presence. The arbitrary dominance I described last year becomes a security problem for people who did not elect this president.

European countries should be capable of defending themselves. I have no objection to that proposition. But there is a difference between building that capacity with them and threatening to remove capabilities while measuring how enthusiastically their governments support your foreign policy. The first requires planning around a shared danger. The second introduces another danger for them to plan around.

I suspect Trump would prefer to sell Europe the means to fight while avoiding the American obligation to participate in its defense. That suspicion has a public basis. Reuters quotes him telling reporters in March 2025, “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them.” At a meeting with Mark Rutte that July, he described the commercial opportunity: “We will manufacture it, and they’re going to be paying for it. We’re in for a lot of money.”

There is a version of American leadership in those sentences that I find disgusting. Other countries face the prospect of destruction; the president finds an opportunity to discuss the revenue. An arms customer can keep buying from you after it has ceased to believe that you will come to its aid.

In the earlier essay, I wrote: “Trump can violate every norm. He can’t build anything that outlasts the performance.” I gave too little weight to what could outlast him without his having built a workable alternative. An alliance could survive on paper while its members cease to plan on American help. A successor’s assurances would then have to overcome the possibility of another American election reversing them.

I also suspect the administration’s knowledge of the danger may help explain its desire to reduce America’s exposure. I cannot establish that motive from the reporting. Nothing cited here proves Trump has been told a particular attack is coming and is moving troops aside to permit it. That would be a further allegation requiring further evidence.

American officials have been warned about a possible test of NATO, and the administration is considering substantial reductions while making allied protection sound conditional. In the Reuters investigation, current and former officials explicitly worried that Trump’s rhetoric could persuade Putin that the West is divided and vulnerable. We do not need access to a secret agreement to ask why American policy is creating precisely the uncertainty a Russian provocation could exploit.

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I have never been more ashamed of my country. I am writing that as an American who still believes we have obligations to other people, including obligations that do not disappear when fulfilling them becomes expensive or frightening. The possibility that our own government is teaching an adversary to doubt those obligations makes me furious.

My anger is directed at people with power and responsibility. A person receiving intelligence briefings has obligations different from those of a voter half-following the news. A business leader who chooses to spend money legitimating an administration has made a different choice from someone struggling to understand events. The journalist deciding how to describe a threat to allied security is exercising professional judgment. Those differences should make accountability more exacting.

I do not owe forgiveness to someone who knowingly helps produce a catastrophe. I do not owe them a future in public life because they eventually decide that the association has become inconvenient. A late statement of concern cannot, by itself, settle what a person did when their cooperation mattered.

But the consequences I want must attach to conduct we can establish. Anyone who committed a crime should face investigation and, where the evidence supports it, prosecution. A lawful decision can still warrant removal from office and lasting public condemnation. Those are different judgments, and anger does not relieve us of the work of making them.

Congress should demand the intelligence assessments provided to the officials conducting the force-posture review, subject to appropriate protections for classified material. It should establish which capabilities any proposed withdrawal would remove, what allied replacements would exist, and how the administration assessed the risk of encouraging a Russian attack. Officials recommending reductions should have to explain their reasoning before the consequences supply an answer for them.

I hope there is no incursion. I hope Putin concludes that any attempt would fail, and that European preparations help make that conclusion unavoidable. Avoiding the war is the outcome I want; being proved right about the danger would be a terrible consolation.

In “What Time Is It?”, I rejected both the assurance that institutions would automatically prevail and the declaration that resistance was already futile. I would keep that argument. What I would add is that recognizing the fragility of these men and their projects must sharpen our attention to the damage they can still do. Their failures will not defend a Baltic border or preserve an American commitment. People have to do those things.

What I cannot accept is an American government receiving warnings about a possible attack on its allies and treating their vulnerability as an instrument of negotiation. If this administration weakens the commitments those countries depend on, the people making that choice should have to answer for what they knew and what they did with the knowledge. I have no interest in a future settlement of our politics that allows them to avoid those questions.

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Go Deeper into the Circus

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